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This paper argues that any speci…c utility or disutility for gam-
bling must be excluded from expected utility because such a theory is
consequential while a pleasure or displeasure for gambling is a mat-
ter of process, not of consequences. A (dis)utility for gambling is
modeled as a process utility which monotonically combines with ex-
pected utility restricted to consequences. This allows for a process
(dis)utility for gambling to be revealed. As an illustration, the model
shows how empirical observations in the Allais paradox can reveal a
process disutility of gambling. A more general model of rational be-
havior combining processes and consequences is then proposed and
discussed.
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11 Introduction
It has long been recognized that people can …nd pleasure in the mere act of
gambling (Pascal, 1670). On the other hand, von Neumann and Morgenstern
explicitly mention that their axiomatic treatment towards expected utility
“eliminates the speci…c utility or disutility of gambling” (1953, pp. 28, 629,
632). Marschak (1950, p. 138) takes the following example:
“[...] the following behavior is not rational: many men, not at
all bent on suicide, are enthusiastic mountain climbers and are
elated, not (or not only) by exercise and scenery but by the very
danger, in the following sense. Suppose the probability of fatal
accident is 5%. The climber may prefer a survival chance of 95%
to one of, say, 80% but also to one of 100%!” (italics are his).
For Marschak, these climber’s preferences violate monotonicity between
probabilities and consequences, which is axiomatically required for the the-
ory of expected utility. Should his behavior be considered irrational? A
climber may like the risk associated with climbing while being prudent. An
entrepreneur may launch a new and risky business while still attempting to
reduce the probability of failure. In other contexts, individuals may have a
speci…c displeasure for gambling, like in the Allais paradox (1953). Since only
some individuals deviate from expected utility in the Allais paradox or like
the thrill of risk in climbing, a pleasure or displeasure for gambling depends
on individuals and on the context in which they act. The issue is whether a
formal model of rational behavior can be su¢ciently open to allow for such a
dependence upon context while remaining su¢ciently structured to support
testable predictions.
Ina paper about the normative validity andthemeaning ofvon Neumann-
Morgenstern utilities, Harsanyi (1993) argues that a speci…c utility or disu-
tility for gambling is excluded from expected utility theory because such a
theory is restricted to “outcome-oriented attitudes”. A utility for gambling
hence appears as a process utility necessarily excluded from expected utility
theory and the relevance of a formal theory covering also process utility is
emphasized (Harsanyi, 1993, p. 314; see also Sen, 1995, pp. 12 and 15). The
consequential nature ofexpected utility theoryhas indeed beenacknowledged
since its axiomatization. However, it is often informally argued that conse-
quences can be de…ned in order to encompass “everything”, i.e. including
process considerations (see for instance Hammond, 1988, 1996). Several au-
thors have nevertheless pointed at the inherent di¢culties of such extensions
of the domain of utility functions. For instance, Harsanyi (1993) argues that
2the exclusion of process utility is necessary to ensure the cardinality of the
expected utility function; Munier (1996) comments Hammond (1996) and
shows that consequences cannot, within an expected utility framework, en-
compass the full memory of the process leading to them; Sen (1997) treats
“comprehensive consequences”—which include procedural concerns, as nec-
essarily incomplete, thus violating a basic axiomatic requirement; Pope (e.g.
1995, 1998) refers to “a pre-outcome” period that generates speci…c emo-
tional considerations excluded by expected utility theory. The next section
illustrates why such a speci…c (dis)utility for gambling cannot be treated by
extending the domain of an expected utility function (section 2).
Inorder tore‡ectthein‡uence ofa(dis)utility for gambling, non-expected
utility models have been proposed (Fishburn, 1980 for an axiomatic treat-
ment; Diecidue et Al., 1999 for an extension and a review; see also Conlisk,
1993). Descriptive measures of the discrepancy between the utility of a sure
outcome and the utility of the same outcome when composed with probabil-
ities are formalized. By maintaining the characterization of choice solely in
terms of consequences, these models thus loose the normative properties of
expected utility theory. In contrast, this paper treats choice as composing
both a process and a consequence and maintains an expected utility function
restricted to consequences. By treating a speci…c pleasure (or displeasure)
of gambling as a process (dis)utility, the model thus preserves part of the
normative character of expected utility functions.
Besides this extension of the entities of choice, the main assumptionof the
model is that process utility combines monotonically with expected utility
of consequences: a procedurally preferred process leading to a (consequen-
tially) preferred consequence should be chosen. This assumption is shown to
be su¢cient for separating a (dis)utility for gambling and to support testable
predictions, for instance in the Allais paradox (section 3). A more general
framework of rational behavior combining processes andconsequences is then
proposed. The axioms of expected utility theory are embedded in a procedu-
ral context that formalizes a qualitative notion of process utility. We justify
this qualitative approach by pointing to the necessary dependence between
processes and consequences (section 4). To our knowledge, no other for-
mal approaches combining process preferences withconsequential preferences
have been developed, despite an emerging body of empirical research on pro-
cess utility (e.g. Sha…r and Tversky, 1992; Gärling et Al., 1996; Donaldson
and Shackley, 1997; Frey and Stutzer, 2000).
32 The Consequential Nature of Expected Util-
ity
The consequential nature of expected utility stems from a “reduction prin-
ciple” stating that the entities of choice need to be solely characterized by
their probability distribution over potential outcomes (Fishburn, 1988, p.
27). Such probability distributions are here called consequences. For von
Neumann and Morgenstern, this consequentialism is the main underlying
hypothesis of expected utility theory (1953, p. 20; see also Fishburn, 1989,
p. 138, 143; Fishburn and Wakker, 1995, p. 1132):
“We have assumed only one thing—and for this there is good em-
pirical evidence—namely that imagined events can be combined
with probabilities. And therefore the same must be assumed for
the utilities attached to them,—whatever they may be”.
Implicit in this statement is that “anything” can be combined with prob-
abilities. If something relevant to rational choice cannot be combined with
probabilities, then it cannot be measured by expected utility theory. The
question thus becomes: can we conceive something that cannot be combined
with probabilities?
The answer is yes, and it su¢ces to provide an example. The attribute
de…ned as “is not combined with probabilities”, i.e. the attribute Not
Gambling; cannot be combined with probabilities since combining Not Gam-
bling with probabilities becomes Gambling. Therefore, expected utility the-
ory cannot measure the attribute Not Gambling and cannot encompass ev-
erything relevant to rational choice.
For the attribute Gambling, this paradoxical construction occurs when
using a multi-attribute version of expected utility (Keeney and Rai¤a, 1976;
see also Fishburn, 1982). Suppose we want to de…ne consequences with an
attribute specifying whether they are probabilistic (Gambling) or not (Not
Gambling). Suppose further that there exists an expected utility function
measuring preferences over such “comprehensive” consequences. As an ex-
ample, consider the choice presented in Figure 1, which is one of the choice
situation in the Allais paradox.
Observing a choice for the upper act and treating Gambling as an at-
tribute (G) of consequences would be represented by the inequality
:10u(G;5M) + :90u(G;0) > :11u(G;1M) + :89u(G;0) (1)
where u is an expected utility function. Hence, the above inequality is
equivalent to










The entity 1u(G;1M) has, however, no possible empirical meaning. It
states that theindividual receives with probability 1 anamount of C1 Million
with the attribute Gambling. But the meaning of Gambling is to character-
ize a probabilistic consequence, not a consequence attained with probability
one. Therefore, expected utility theory cannot consider consequences such
as the one assigning unit probability to (G;1M) because such a consequence
does not exist and will never be empirically observable. As a result, the
attributes Gambling or Not Gambling cannot be measured by an expected
utility function.
3 A Process (Dis)Utility for Gambling
In order to take account of Gambling or Not Gambling while preserving the
expected utility function and its properties, we treat these attributes outside
the expected utility function. The domain of the expected utility function is
explicitly restricted to consequences and choice reveals a preference relation
over combinations of processes and consequences. In this manner, conse-
quences retain their interpretationas probability distributions over outcomes
(degenerate or not) while any entity that remains under the control of the in-
dividual is interpreted as a process. A behavior that is empirically observable
is assumed to comprise both a process and a consequence.
In order to study a speci…c pleasure or displeasure for gambling, pro-
cesses are de…ned as taking the attribute Gambling (G) when they lead to
a probabilistic consequence (i.e. a non-degenerate probability distribution)
and as taking the attribute Not Gambling (G) when they lead to a determin-
istic consequence (a degenerate probability distribution, i.e. a sure outcome).
5For a consequence c, a behavior is thus written (G;c) or (G;c) depending
on whether c is probabilistic or deterministic respectively. Choice, i.e. em-
pirically observable preferences over behaviors, is re‡ected by a preference
relation %B over behaviors. The model further assumes a monotonicity con-
dition between processes and consequences, i.e. that a behavior composed of
a preferred process and a preferred consequence should be chosen. As shown
below, such a structure allows for a speci…c utility or disutility for gambling
to be separated from choice.
Consider the choice situations depicted in Figure 2. Compare them to
Figure 1. The individual is now depicted and Gambling characterizes the
process. This illustrates the modi…cation of the entities of choice from conse-






























c ÂC d (4)
where ÂC is the induced preference relation over consequences only. In
this manner, the process attribute Gambling has been “abstracted” and the
conventional expected utility reasoning applies over consequences. We have
therefore
c ÂC d () u(c) > u(d) () u(c0) > u(d0) , c0 ÂC d0: (5)
6where c0 denotes the probabilistic consequence of receiving C5M with prob-
ability .1, C1M with probability .89 and nothing with probability .01; while
the deterministic consequence of receiving C1M is denoted d0: Therefore, em-
pirical observation of a choice for the upper behavior in the …rst situation
of …gure 2 implies that the consequence c0 is consequentially preferred to the
consequence d0. Because the individual may have a disutility for gambling,
it does not follow that the upper behavior (G;c0) should be preferred to the
lower behavior (G;d0). Besides, if (G;c0) 6%B (G;d0); a process disutility can
be revealed. The reasoning follows.
Suppose the individual would have a process utility for gambling, that
is G ÂA G where ÂA is the induced preference relation over processes; then
he should choose the upper behavior (G;c0): Such a behavior is indeed “op-
timal” in the sense it is composed of a preferred process and a preferred
consequence. Thus, if the individual does not choose (G;c0); he must have a







0g =) G Â
A G: (6)
A process disutility for gambling being revealed, testable predictions can
be proposed. For instance, if a deterministic consequence d00 ÂC d0 is substi-
tuted for d0; we must have (G;d00) ÂB (G;c0): Observing the reverse would
violate the explanation with a disutility for gambling and the individual
would be considered “irrational”. Another pattern is shown in Figure 3. If
(G;e) ÂB (G;c) is observed, then (G;e0) ÂB (G;c00) should also be observed
for the model not to be falsi…ed. Such a pattern would not be explained by
expected utility theory alone and illustrates howthe consideration of process
preferences allows for a larger class of behaviors to be treated as rational.
























7First, the observation of (G;c) ÂB (G;d) and (G;c0) ÂB (G;d0) is consis-
tent with a utility for gambling but also with a disutility for gambling. The
individual may have a disutility for gambling that has too little “strength”
to reverse expected utility of consequences and a speci…c (dis)utility for gam-
bling would require additional empirical observations to be revealed.
Second, expected utility of consequences must remain valid for a process
(dis)utility for gambling to be revealed. In particular, the independence
condition between probabilities and consequences must hold for establishing
expression (5). In this sense, this model builds on expected utility rather
than invalidates it.
Third, the reasoning that reveals a process (dis)utility for gambling is
counterfactual: because (G;c0) %B (G;d0) is not observed, we are able to
infer that G ÂA G. This requires the empirical ordering %B to be complete
while it cannot encompass all combinations of processes and consequences (a
choice for a behavior like (G;d0) cannot be empirically observed since (G;d0)
does not exist). This requires a careful de…nition of the set of available
behaviors and is treated in the next section.
Finally, andcontrary to the interpretation of Marschak (see introduction),
the monotonicity condition between probabilities and consequence is main-
tained. In Marschak’s example, the climbing route with a survival chance
of 100% is consequentially preferred to the climbing route with a survival
chance of 95%, which is itself consequentially preferred to the climbing route
with a survival chance of 80%. In terms of expected utility of consequences,
these three routes monotonically rank in decreasing order. However, when
the process is taken into account, it can be more fun to have some riski-
ness and a climber may rationally choose to climb the route with a survival
chance of 95%, being prudent and moved by the thrill of risk at the same
time. What the climber chooses is not merely a probability of survival but
also comprises a certain process of climbing.
4 A Model Combining Processes and Conse-
quences
This section presents a general model that quali…es an expected utility func-
tion over consequences by outside procedural considerations. It establishes
the extent to which process preferences can be separated from consequential
preferences represented by the expected utility function. To this aim, it …rst
makes explicit our assumption that behavior is composed of both a process
and a consequence.
8A process is denoted by a 2 A and a consequence by c 2 C: The set A is
the set of processes and the set C is the set of consequences. Consequences
depend on processes through a consequence function g with domain A and
range C. This is written g : A ! C; a 7! g(a) 2 C. A situation of choice
then corresponds to the set of available behaviors B = f(a;g(a)) : a 2 Ag
and a binary relation %B on B that is both complete and transitive re‡ects
empirical observation of rational behavior. This is our …rst axiom:
Axiom 1 (Behavioral Preferences) The binary relation %B is a weak or-
dering of B.
Rational individuals are then supposed to make judgments over processes
and over consequences. These judgments are re‡ected by weak orderings %A
and %Cof the sets A and C respectively.
Axiom 2 (Procedural Judgments) The binary relation %A is a weak or-
dering of A.
Axiom 3 (Consequential Judgments) The binary relation %C is a weak
ordering of C.
These three orderings are now combined through a weak monotonicity
condition. This axiom states that a behavior composed of a procedurally
preferred process anda consequentially preferred consequence should be cho-
sen. Called the optimality axiom, it provides the structure with normative
implications.
Axiom 4 (Optimality) If a %A a0 and g(a) %C g(a0) then (a;g(a)) %B
(a0;g(a0)):
The following propositions are now derived. The …rst expresses a depen-
dent revelation of preferences over processes.
Proposition 1 f(a0;g(a0)) ÂB (a;g(a)) and g(a) %C g(a0)g =) a0 ÂA a:
Proof. By contraposition ofthe optimality axiom, we have not[(a;g(a)) %B
(a0;g(a0))] =) fnot[g(a) %C g(a0)] or not[a %A a0]g. Since not[(a;g(a)) %B
(a0;g(a0))] () (a0;g(a0)) ÂB (a;g(a)) and not[a %A a0] () a0 ÂA a ; we
have f(a0;g(a0)) ÂB (a;g(a)) and g(a) %C g(a0)g =) a0 ÂA a:
Similarly, dependent revelation of preferences over consequences is formu-
lated as:
9Proposition 2 f(a0;g(a0)) ÂB (a;g(a)) and a %A a0g =) g(a0) ÂC g(a):
Proof. Same as above.
Although behavioral preferences %B are the only observable preferences,
judgmental preferences %A and %C can be revealed dependently on each
other. This formalizes the implication of expressions (4) and expression (6)
in the previous section.
Axioms of expected utility are now assumed, here in the form proposed
by Herstein and Milnor (1953) where C is a mixture set.








for any e 2 C:
Axiom 6 (Continuity) For any c;d;e 2 C;f¸c + (1 ¡ ¸)d %C eg and
fe %C ¸c+ (1 ¡ ¸)dg are closed subsets of [0;1]:
Theorem 3 (Expected Utility of Consequences) Axioms 3, 5, 6 hold
if and only if there exists an order-preserving linear functional u on C such
that for all c;d 2 C; we have c %C d , u(c) > u(d) with u(¸c + (1 ¡
¸)d) = ¸u(c) + (1 ¡ ¸)u(d): Such a functional is unique up to a positive
a¢ne transformation.
Axioms 3, 5 and 6 allow for the derivation of expression (5) in the above
section: For elicitation purposes, the bias from a utility or a disutility for
gambling can be avoided through comparison of non-degenerate probability
distributions (see e.g. Wakker andDene¤e, 1996). Remarks onthe speci…city
of this model now conclude this section.
We have considered a complete empirical ordering %B over a strict subset
of the product set A£C so that %B is complete over B and incomplete over
A £ C: This subset B = f(a;g(a)) : a 2 Ag is de…ned in a non-arbitrary
manner because of the speci…cation of the consequence function g: Without
specifying g, %Bwould have been incompletely or arbitrarily de…ned and
the counterfactual reasoning that reveals process preferences would not be
properly justi…ed (for %B incomplete b0 ÂB b < not[b %B b0]). Our model
thus di¤ers from Sen (1997) where procedural concerns are treated through
an incomplete ordering over “comprehensive” consequences and where no
separation of process preferences takes place.
On the other hand, specifying g re‡ects an empirical dependence between
processes and consequences. For g being an application, some processes can-
not be combined with some consequences and conjoint measurement does
not apply because the independent realization of components is not ful…lled
10(see Krantz et Al., 1971, p. 246 for the role of this speci…c independence
condition). In this framework, no continuous and monotonic function over
behaviors is thus de…ned. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that process pref-
erences can be revealed as a ranking. This re‡ects an ordinal approach to
process utility (seeHarsanyi, 1993). Since consequential utilities remainmea-
sured cardinally by the expected utility function, behavior is “measured” by
the combination of an ordinal and a cardinal scale. Further research should
investigate the speci…city of such a formulation.
5 Concluding Remarks
Although expected utility has been widely criticized for its descriptive in-
adequacy, and that e¤orts have been dedicated to construct alternative ap-
proaches, the dominant view is that it remains the proper normative model
(Wakker and Dene¤e, 1996). Rather than modifying its axioms, this paper
explicitly restricts expected utility to consequences and considers that ob-
servable behavior always implies a process that remains under the control of
the individual. Assuming that such behavioral process does not—or should
not, be taken into account in the modeling of rational behavior becomes
a limit-case. In the general case, rational individuals can be motivated by
both procedural and consequential considerations. Beside expected utility of
consequences, the main assumption of the model is thus that rational indi-
viduals make judgments on the process by which they reach consequences
and that a rational individual should prefer a behavior composed of a pre-
ferred process and a preferred consequence. Under these conditions, process
preferences can be revealed and support testable implications. This model is
introduced by an original treatment of the Allais paradox according to which
expected utility, when properly restricted to consequences, is actually not
violated by individuals having a speci…c process disutility for gambling. Be-
yond consequentialism, further work may interestingly study the combination
of procedural and consequential considerations.
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